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ABSTRACT There has been a generalised anxiety concerning the future of continental
philosophy of religion as a discipline, with a number of books, articles, conferences, and
presentations taking up this theme. This anxiety exists because as a discipline continental
philosophy of religion lacks a clear claim to an identity. This article analyses the anxiety
concerning the future of continental philosophy of religion as an anxiety of reproduction. By
locating the philosopher’s anxiety within a wider anxiety of reproduction we begin to
understand this anxiety through the queer anti-social critique of Lee Edelman. This anxiety is
traced through three processes of reproduction: intellectual reproduction, disciplinary
reproduction, and institutional reproduction. The article goes on to sketch out a position
against the reproduction of continental philosophy of religion by taking on and celebrating the
discipline’s improper nature. Appealing neither to secular reason nor to established traditions,
we draw on the Malleus Maleﬁcarum (as read through queer theory and non-philosophy) to
craft various models for thought. Here we ﬁnd abortion prized over the future of the race,
miscegenation over blood purity, and impotence and infertility over the sovereign power of
the father. These models are explored both in terms of their historical context and as providing a different image of the work that can be carried out in the discipline of continental
philosophy of religion. The article concludes by suggesting other perverse lines of relation
that may be opened up when one gives up on the reproduction of the discipline.
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Introduction
o hear people talk, no one much cares for the present.
Everything is a program 'for the future', a time that is said
to be on the way, to be coming, and that dominates and
harasses us now. 'Plan for the future', comes the demand, 'Plan for
me'. That rush of panic and fear, lying in bed, holding another in
your arms, no longer in the moment, but thinking, 'How are we
going to afford this?' The moment of impropriety gives itself over
to propriety and the concern for property. The embrace of a lover
is given over to the reproduction of the species, to the continued
world-building and world-sustaining project of a forever deferred
future that requires the undermining and the deferral of pleasure
now.
This concern with the future is not only a matter of love and
romance, but structures all our endeavours, including our intellectual attempts to make sense of the world we have been thrown
into. To speak of the future is to speak speculatively, so to speak
of the future is to do philosophy. The question before us now is
that of the future of continental philosophy of religion, but before
such a question can be answered we have to analyse what is really
being asked. To speak about the future of a discipline is to speak
about its reproduction. Subsequently, to ask what is the future of
continental philosophy of religion is really to ask, how will continental philosophy of religion reproduce itself?
Too often philosophers and theologians consider their disciplinary practices only as abstracted from the material conditions
which structure this intellectual labour. This occlusion of the
material realm allows for a spiritualisation of work that mirrors
the new spirit of capitalism found in the neoliberal university. It
also allows for the question to be asked as if it were a concern for
the other, the future that is not ours or not mine, but rather that
of 'the Child' (Edelman, 2004). Within the symbolic register, the
Child appears as other but is in fact constituted by a disavowed
desire for more of the same. One is concerned with the Child as
the product of the Father and the Mother, as the reproduction of
their genes in new form. In the same way that the reproduction of
self through the Child functions as the sexual form of our social
ontology, asking about the future form of a discipline is a disavowed way of asking about that discipline’s survival as our
discipline. What have we been doing with our lives if all of it
comes to nothing, we might be tempted to ask during those dark
nights of the soul that haunt academics in the humanities. Yet the
better question is, why do we want something rather than nothing
anyway? What if we could get what we want for nothing?1
This will surely strike the reader as a strange question, as a
reversal of the usual philosophical question of why there is
something rather than nothing. We hold that this question reveals
truths about the deep structure of continental philosophy of
religion, and such philosophical/theological projects more generally. We argue that any consideration of the future of continental philosophy of religion must take it seriously as an
institutional practice which relies on and reproduces relations of
property and propriety. These reproductive practices take place at
the intellectual level, the disciplinary level, and the institutional
level. At the intellectual level, ideas are reproduced in texts and
through citational practices; at the disciplinary level, intellectual
and social norms are reproduced through social and pedagogical
relationships; and at the institutional level, academics reproduce
both social class and the university itself. To understand these
processes of reproduction we build on existing scholarship,
usually critical, of the university. Rather than aiming to add to
these critiques, we gather them together to provide the context for
the constructive project that follows.
After unpacking and analysing each of these forms of reproduction, we ask whether thinking from the abortion rather than
the reproduction of continental philosophy of religion might
2

reveal the constitutional duplicity of continental philosophy of
religion. As a discipline, continental philosophy of religion is
improper: neither wholly Christian, nor fully secular. As such,
two models of reproduction are available to it: ﬁlial transmission
of paternal inheritance or fraternal denial of ﬁliation. Against
both options, we propose to exploit the impropriety present in
continental philosophy of religion so as to bewitch the discipline.
In this bewitched state we are easily led towards more radical
practices of thought that are wilfully negligent of their own
reproduction. Appealing neither to secular reason nor to established traditions, we draw on the Malleus Maleﬁcarum to craft
various models for thought. We read the Malleus Maleﬁcarum
through queer theory and develop it into what François Laruelle
terms 'philo-ﬁction'.2 Here we ﬁnd abortion prized over the future
of the race, miscegenation over blood purity, and impotence and
infertility over the sovereign power of the father.
Processes of reproduction
Thinking continental philosophy of religion. As Carol Pateman
argues, the birth of modernity is marked by the transition from a
paternal model of inheritance and reproduction to a fraternal
denial of ﬁliation which continues the tradition of patriarchal
power in the form of the claim to escape paternal authority
(Pateman, 1988, pp. 2–3). This shift may also be understood as
the transition from the political theological structure of medieval
Christendom, whose authoritative structures and traditions were
understood to be handed down unchanged from the Fathers to
the secularised insistence on the sovereignty of the individual. It
entailed, that is to say, the transposition of characteristics which
had previously been attributed to God onto the individual subject,
understood to be (at least potentially) self-grounding, all-powerful, and all-knowing. We may also understand it in relation to
the secularising move in which the West repeats differently the
original move by which Christianity invented both itself and
religion. Where the birth of Christianity was made possible by the
denial of ﬁliation (such that there is in Christ no longer Jew nor
Greek but only Christians, set up against those who remain
outside of Christ and therefore salvation) (Anidjar, 2014, p. 254),
so too the secular was born from the cutting of the umbilical cord
which tied the secular West to its own particular Christian history, emancipating itself from religion, amongst other forms of
dependency which come to be conceived in opposition to the selfgrounding freedom of the properly human subject (Barber, 2011,
p. 111).
Continental philosophy of religion has long been characterised
by a fraught relationship to these two models – paternal and
fraternal, Christian and secular. Perhaps the starkest examples of
this are, on the one hand, those who see the goal of continental
philosophy of religion being to call Christianity’s wayward
children back to the fold, demanding that they faithfully honour
their inheritance with the threat that, should they fail to do so,
they will be left in the pigsty with nothing; or those for whom
continental philosophy of religion must, to come of age,
emancipate itself from its degenerate forebears.
But these forms of reproduction extend beyond the question of
continental philosophy of religion’s relation to religion (or, as this
so often means in practice, to Christianity and Christendom), and
concern also the discipline’s relation to philosophy. Continental
philosophy is distinguished in part by the ways it is both
consciously and unconsciously genealogical, formed as a
discipline precisely by its relation to a particular tradition of
thought; constituted as an ongoing conversation whose deep
engagement in ongoing traditions of thought are one of the
reasons it is so often characterised as “difﬁcult”. Its attention to
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questions of power and its genealogical approach are set up in
some ways in opposition to the tendency of modern thought to
abstract itself from history and from genealogy, and its critical
force derives from this insistence on paying attention to the
history of the thinkers and ideas with which it concerns itself. But
this focus on tradition is also crucial to the ways in which it
reproduces itself. To engage in the task of continental philosophy
is to be expected to have read everything, to have mastered the
conversation, to be able to position oneself in relation to historical
debates and tendencies; and this insistence on knowing one’s
family history functions not only to enable critique but also (as
with so many forms of academic specialisation) to limit it. Who
has time to read not only in their own immediate area of work
but also outside of it, to understand not only what is at stake in
the differences between Deleuze and Derrida but also to bring
those thinkers into productive encounter with Black Studies?
Continental philosophers constitute a large and a fractious clan,
but like so many close extended families the demand for
participation works to ensure the reproduction of kinship.
Yet the way out of this bind cannot simply be to seek to escape
ﬁliation. Just as the fraternities of medieval Europe sought a form
of life free from the ties of kinship and reproductive labour but
relied on the unacknowledged and salviﬁcally worthless work of
women and peasants, so too the fraternal form of sovereignty on
which modernity founds itself is built on the invisibilised labour
of slaves, women, and the working class. Continental philosophy
shares this desire to escape dependency, understood as a limit to
freedom;3 to deny its origins and to erase the racialised, gendered
and classed work which makes it possible (Irigaray, 1985; Barber,
2011; Bousquet, 2008) so as to position itself as self-sufﬁcient, free
and enlightened. This denial of inheritance can also function as
the desire for innocence; the desire to leave behind a shameful
past or move towards a better future; as the desire for conversion
into something better which itself functions to reproduce the
world (Barber, 2016) and to reproduce the logics of the discipline.
Disciplining continental philosophy of religion. Loath though
we are to acknowledge this, continental philosophy of religion
does not exist solely in the minds of those who practice it. Ideas
must circulate, and circulation requires economies—of money,
prestige, and social connections. Continental philosophy of religion is, amongst other things, an apparatus composed of texts
(book series, monographs, edited collections, journal articles, blog
posts, emails, social media posts), events (conferences, symposia,
lectures, seminars, meetings), people (publishers, editors, peer
reviewers, professors, students, enthusiasts) and institutions
(universities, publishing houses, conference centres, networks,
funding bodies). It needs—perhaps above all else—to keep itself
going, to reproduce itself as a discipline, to assure its own future.
Academic disciplines emerged ﬁrst with the birth of the
university, and alongside the many forms of classiﬁcation which
created by carving up the world into new distinctions of race,
nation and class at the birth of the modern world (Federici, 2004;
Wynter, 1994; Moore, 1987). Traditional academic disciplines are
—like the prisons, factories, schools and madhouses of Foucault’s
disciplinary power—clearly contained, controlled and observed.
A later birth, continental philosophy of religion is perhaps a
quintessentially postmodern—that is to say, a post-Fordist,
control society, late capitalist, neo-imperialist, liberal democratic
discipline—and its disciplinary practices reﬂect this. Doubly
improper, both as philosophy and as religion, continental
philosophy of religion often ﬁnds itself at the edges of academic
economies of power and prestige, relying on more informal
(though often no less violent) networks for its propagation.
Perhaps it is this very impropriety which makes the discipline so
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eager to mark out its terrain and to assert its patrimony.4 Much
ink has been spilled on the topic of the future of the continental
philosophy of religion; yet as within the university in general
there is comparatively little discussion of the material conditions
in and by which the discipline assures its future. Who decides
which books are to be published, who is to be hired, which junior
scholars are to be protected from the violence of precarity? These
questions and concerns are not mere abstractions, but concern
real people who—however much we value their work or the
traditions they have come to symbolise—are part of the very
reproduction of society and so have interests that are shaped by
their gender, class, and racial position within the world.
Institutionalising continental philosophy of religion. If the
disciplinary practices which ensure the reproduction of the continental philosophy of religion too often go examined, questions
of the role of continental philosophers of religion within the
institution of the university are all but invisible. This is perhaps
unsurprising within a system in which those most able to publish
are also those with access to the most resources, those most able
to imagine themselves, like medieval monastics, as living the pure
life of the mind. For those further down the hierarchy, scrambling
to survive precarity and ever-increasing teaching and administrative loads, the demands of the university are more pressing but
can seem, nonetheless, like a distraction rather than the real
purpose of our work.
The university is a central apparatus of the persecuting society
which the West became over the medieval period (Moore, 1987);
it is a machine for the creation and reproduction of race, class,
and gender (Moten and Harney, 2004). To work in the university
is, therefore, to reproduce ourselves as the intellectual class; to
reproduce the 'ideas of the ruling class'; to reproduce the
university as a proﬁt-generating, market-sustaining and borderguarding machine; and to be charged with the reproductive
labour by which teenagers complete their transformation into
neoliberal subjects (Marx and Engels, 2000; Brown, 2015;
Bousquet, 2008). As tempting as it is to believe ourselves the
vanguard of the radical university, to become incorporated into
the university machine is to become materially invested in the
reproduction of the university as institution and of ourselves as
experts. No wonder that when the chips are down we are so often
willing to call in the cops, take the knife to our colleagues’
pensions, or side with our peers against our students (see, e.g.,
Grove, 2015; Payne, 2018; Nancy, 2018).
For many of us, perhaps the majority, our most important
audience is not our academic peers, 'the public' or even 'the
Church', ﬂattering though this might be to believe. Instead, our
most important work is done in the classroom. Teaching is social
reproduction, and carries with it the profound ambivalence of all
reproductive labour: to form our students into good citizens and
useful workers for a society built on violence and exploitation.
Often this involves training them (sometimes despite our best
efforts) in the fundamentally conservative moral relativism so
essential for workers in an economy which prizes ﬂexibility above
all else; ultimately our task is to teach them how to survive in a
world which ought not to exist.
The university is a central cog within local economies, border
regimes, and mechanisms of class discipline. Administrative work
may feel like a distraction—and may in fact function to distract us
from the difﬁcult work of understanding the university in order
to work against it—but what we do in meetings, the forms we ﬁll
out, the monitoring and assessing work we do forms us, our
students, and the university as an institution. As the implementation of the Prevent strategy in British universities exempliﬁes,
there is no way to care for our students that does not also enmesh
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them in systems of monitoring which exist to reproduce the
world which puts them to work for its own purposes (Lister et al.,
2015; Kundnani, 2015). We cannot engage in institutional or
strategic planning without keeping alive the university as a source
of violence.
There is no such thing as a radical university; there is no
straightforward experience of teaching as liberation or of
administration as revolutionary. To survive in the university is
to co-operate in its reproduction, to work with it even as we
struggle also to work against it, to reproduce it precisely by our
longing for something better. What would it mean to take
responsibility for this inescapable complicity?
The transmogriﬁcation of continental philosophy of religion
The Malleus Maleﬁcarum, the medieval manual on the nature,
practices and prosecution of witches was ﬁrst published in 1486
and for almost two centuries was the second-bestselling book in
Europe after the Bible. Written at the beginning of the modern
era, its European inﬂuence spanned a period which saw the birth
of biopower, the European discovery of the Americas, the
emergence of the nation state, and the formation of the social
contract. Its authors—Dominican priests, professors of theology
and zealous inquisitors—exemplify the entanglement of church,
state, and university which prevailed in late medieval Europe.
Written during apocalyptic times, it seeks to stave off the collapse
of the social order by setting out a framework for theorising,
investigating, and prosecuting witches, whose transgressive
behaviours are understood to threaten social reproduction. At the
heart of the text are profound anxieties about women, gender and
reproduction which reﬂect the dramatic transformation in the
gendered organisation of society taking place at the time of the
Malleus Maleﬁcarum’s writing. Women, according to Kramer and
Sprenger, are naturally less moderate, more prone to belief, more
changeable, more gossipy, and less perfect (Kramer and Sprenger,
2009, p. 160–165). Less able than men to resist the lures of the
devil, they threaten not only the present but above all the future;
drawing on demonic powers to make men impotent, to cause
miscarriages or abortions, to devour or dedicate to the devil newly
born children, or to change their shape. The theories, practices
and procedures the Malleus Maleﬁcarum lays out illuminate the
disciplinary practices emerging in European states in this period,
which came to be crucial resources for the dramatic transformations of the organisation of race, class and gender on which the
modern world was built. The text suggests itself as a resource for
contemporary thought for a number of reasons: it embodies the
profound entanglement of the late medieval university with
emerging biopolitical practices; it seeks to hold together Christian
and secular thought during a period where the two were
becoming increasingly distinct; and it reﬂects social, theological
and philosophical anxieties about reproduction. What we ﬁnd in
the Malleus Maleﬁcarum is not a faithful account of contemporary pagan practices but, instead, a projection of the
anxieties which drove the transformation of nascent European
state power. The witches of the text are not faithful renditions of
real people or practices but, rather sinthomosexual ﬁgures in Lee
Edelman’s sense (Edelman, 2004): embodiments of the unassimilable excess generated by the contemporary social order, hallucinatory ﬁgures of the pleasure understood to threaten proper
social discipline.
From within the West, there is no simple outside to the
Christian, or to the secular which repeats the logic of Christianity.
As for so many gnostic, heretical, or pagan threats to Christianity,
what we know of medieval witches comes to us not pure (as
though there could be some pure outside to Christianity within
medieval Europe), but as a distortion and a hallucination from
4

within Christianity. Likewise, there is no escape into propriety for
the continental philosophy of religion, which is marked always by
the impropriety of the religious, by the impropriety of the overdetermination of the religious by the Christian, and by the
impossible desire to escape that impropriety.
What we propose, then, is not escape but instead an intensiﬁcation of witchcraft’s impropriety, to inhabit and afﬁrm its
excess with respect to the proper. Women, according to Kramer
and Sprenger’s false etymology of their Latin name, femina, are
those who have by nature 'less faith' ('fe' and 'minus'). Witchcraft
is not entirely an escape into the innocence of faithlessness, then,
but consists of the possibilities opened up by believing less, not
quite trusting in right belief enough to guarantee its reproduction
(Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 165). Within the material conditions of the modern university and its social ontology, the
continental philosopher of religion will continue to be a structural
remainder to proper reproduction—neither fully theological and
thereby Christian, nor fully secular; neither properly faithful nor
properly faithless; simply not proper. Continental philosophy of
religion, at its best, concerns itself with the improper elements of
both the theological and the secular: not only with God but with
angels and demons, heaven and hell, thinking according to an
improper logic which refuses simply to afﬁrm or to deny their
ontological reality; not only with the mystical purity of thought
but with the seeping bodies and questionable practices of the
mystics. We turn here to witchcraft and to the Malleus Maleﬁcarum, then, not to escape Christianity or to purge continental
philosophy of its embarrassing desire for doctrinal propriety, but
in order to interrupt, disrupt, or distort the reproduction of the
continental philosophy of religion for the sake of the pleasure of
thinking.
Impotence. Modern readers of medieval witchcraft treatises will
surely be surprised at the constant fear present of witches stealing
penises. One does not need an advanced education in Freud’s
theories of the psycho-sexual development of men to see and
understand the deep anxieties of the fragile masculine ego and
patriarchal power at the root of these stories; but the psychoanalytic framework, especially as developed by queer theorists,
allows for a more ﬁnely tuned analysis of these anxieties. The
authors of the Malleus Maleﬁcarum go to great lengths to push
back against the magical thinking found within witchcraft. They
tell us that, of course, witches cannot actually take away “male
members,” but they can make them appear to disappear through
conjuring (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 195). The reasons why
the authors need to secure the reality of the penis against its
apparent disappearance are rooted in a commitment to a form of
metaphysical realism common amongst Dominican theologians
of the time. Quite simply, they tell us, demons cannot take away
that which contributes to the reality of the human body. So
disappearing penises are illusory, though not just illusions in the
imagination of the person affected. Others may share in this
illusion, which demons and their witches carry out through
deceiving a person’s physical senses and sometimes their inner
senses of perception (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 195). The
authors go on to explain the various methods available for
bringing about these illusions, which run the gamut from banal
sleight of hand tricks, to non-consensually drugging men so that
they hallucinate the loss of their penis, to psychic deception by a
demon carried out only with God’s permission (Kramer and
Sprenger, 2009, p. 198).
There is a deeper truth here that is surfaced but repressed by
the authors. While it may have been true that the disappearing of
penises was mere illusion this is not because, as the authors claim,
these penises eventually reappeared and so their disappearance
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was not permanent (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 199). Rather,
the disappearing of these penises was and is illusion because the
penis itself is an illusion. We do not mean that the bodily organ is
an illusion, but that all of what is caught up in the symbolic
meaning of the penis—what is known in psychoanalysis as the
phallus—is an illusion.
The stealing of penises by witches is, on our reading, the
paradigmatic example of how witches bring about impotence.
The anxieties around reproduction revealed by Kramer and
Sprenger’s writing about impotence appear to centre on the
question of authority and power, speciﬁcally male power. To be
impotent is literally to be lacking in power, speciﬁcally with
regard to the sexual act and so with regard to reproduction. They
report a number of forms of impotence, drawing largely on Peter
de Palude’s Commentary on Sorcery, where impotence centres
around the prevention of 'bodies approaching one another' either
through direct or indirect means (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p.
194). Witches and demons may work together so that men want
to have sex with the wrong kind of woman or do not want to have
sex with the right kind of woman, through various appeals to
estimation and imagination, making some women appear
loathsome, and even through direct physical means—suppressing
the erection of the penis or halting the progress of semen (the
seed) along the vessels of procreation. Yet in each of these cases,
while Kramer and Sprenger recognise the same actions may be
taken with regard to women, such as removing their desire for
their husbands, it is easier to suppress the erection of the penis
than anything else and so men are more vulnerable than women
to being rendered impotent by such witchcraft.
In Lacanian psychoanalysis the phallus takes on a particular
character as split between the overarching tripartite structure of
the real, the symbolic, and the imaginary. For Lacan, the
imaginary phallus emerges prior to the oedipal stage where it is
understood by the child as an “image of the penis” where the
organ is a part-object that can be removed. The child infers an
image of the phallus speciﬁcally as the object of the mother’s
desire beyond the child and so the child seeks to identify him or
herself with this object of desire. In other words, the child wants
to be the phallus of the mother. The child cannot be this phallus
and this is the castration that the child must accept in order to
develop beyond this stage.
At this point the phallus changes status from imaginary to
symbolic. Important for our reading here is that the symbolic
phallus is no longer taken as a part-object, but now 'is a signiﬁer
[…] It is the signiﬁer intended to designate as a whole the effects
of the signiﬁed' (Lacan, 2006, p. 285). The symbolic phallus is
taken as a kind of securer of meaning, the meta-signiﬁer that
makes possible the relationship of signiﬁer and signiﬁed. In other
words, the symbolic phallus functions in much the same way as
does theodicy in the Malleus Maleﬁcarum, where the experience
of evil is placed within an overarching structure of God’s
sovereignty that secures the very meaning such evil threatens to
undo.
Anxiety of impotence lies behind many of the anxieties
produced by the reproductive structure of continental philosophy
of religion. The magical theft of penises becomes, then, a model
for continental philosophy of religion that philosophers of
religion may use to release ourselves from the rule of the phallus
and its phantasmic fundamental place in reproduction. The
phallus—again taken here as the name for what, like the male
penis, passes on the seed of the discipline—is also taken as the
fundamental image for doing philosophy in a powerful way.
Instead of this drive towards power, particularly power understand in such a unitary and rigid way, thinking according to
impotence provides a model of doing continental philosophy of
religion without concern for such engorged forms of power.

ARTICLE

We steal penises—that is, we steal those elements of philosophy
that are taken to be precious, to be the very location of a
philosopher’s rigid power—so as to expose those objects or those
ideas for the fundamentally fungible reality they are. Instructive
here is a bizarre and hilarious story in the Malleus Maleﬁcarum.
Kramer and Sprenger report that a man woke to found his penis
missing and went to the local witch in order to ask for it back.
Though Kramer and Sprenger do not offer insight into the reason
why the witch took pity on the man, she tells him that he may
climb a certain tree and ﬁnd a nest full of penises from which he
could take any he wanted. When he attempted to take a
particularly large one, the witch counselled against this as it
belonged to the local priest.
This witch is said to be like many others who keep 'large
numbers of these members (20 or 30 at once) in a bird’s nest or in
some cabinet, where the members move as if alive or eat a stalk or
fodder' (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 328). Of course, for
Kramer and Sprenger these gaggles of penises are only an illusion,
for the physical penis had not truly been removed. This works all
the better for our model, since the kind of phalluses we are
speaking of are those overarching ideas that shape the relation of
a philosopher to other philosophers and of this group of people to
the discipline itself. The witch returns us to the preoedipal stage
of development wherein the penis is taken as a part-object, one
that can be removed and used differently than it comes to be
intended when our sexuality settles and solidiﬁes upon certain
bodily organs. Instead of being the signiﬁer of the whole, it
becomes just another thing to work with or play with, just more
material. We might make a nest out of them or we might plant
one or two in the ground and see what happens. We will not,
however, centre our entire identity upon the phallus; it is no
longer allowed to drive the reproductive practices of the
discipline.
Let us translate this witchy model into more everyday
language. So much of the anxiety of intellectual work is centred
around one’s power, taken in this particular rigid way. Much of
the intellectual work of continental philosophy of religion is
undertaken with an eye towards its impact or, ultimately, its
meaning, for a particular community. Is the meaning of
continental philosophy of religion found in its Christian identity
or its secular identity; and which identity will we be able to pass
on? The answer, once we are freed from the underlying desire for
meaning, for the underlying desire that there be something to
pass this work on to, is that there is no meaning, at least not in
the necessary sense.
Is our hope in nothing? Well, yes. When we give up on the
desire to secure a future for our intellectual work, we can give
ourselves over to a joy in the work for its own sake. When, as the
subject who can now look upon the phallus as a fantasy, then we
see that we do this work for nothing. Such a claim need not be
understood as nihilistic in the sense that a scientiﬁc worldview
reveals there to be no inherent meaning in the universe. It may be
thought instead, through some of the mystical traditions which
have deeply formed the continental philosophy of religion. The
mystical conception of nothing we are drawing on here is
metaphysical, such that even at the heart of the meaning of
nothingness there is a further undoing of meaning (Dubilet, 2019;
Rose, 2019). Such a metaphysical nothing should not be confused
with the ever growing demand for free labour from academics.
There is no way to extract wealth from this nothing, which
unmoors us from the world and its demands to reproduce, and in
fact such a non-phallic conception of work would encourage one
to think beyond the engorging of power with a singular purpose
and encourage a more diffuse form of strength without concern
for its reception.
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Miscarriage and abortion. Of course, conception is no guarantee
of reproduction and the anxieties of the Malleus Maleﬁcarum’s
authors do not begin and end with male potency. The intensiﬁcation of European anxiety over the control of reproduction
which began in this period is clearly evident in the text. Located
as it is in Europe, the primary focus of the author’s concern is the
safe gestation and birth of infants rather than, as became
increasingly important once the colonial and racist logics incubating here were more fully birthed, the desire to hold back the
threat of the dark swarming hordes of the wrong kinds of babies.
If white children are to have a future they must be allowed to
come to term, and women’s bodies must be expropriated from
them so as to be ' “liberated” from any impediment preventing
them to function as machines for the reproduction of labour'
(Federici, 2004, p. 184). At stake here is not merely the reproduction of individual family units, but also of the larger bodies
whose regulation and control becomes a pressing concern in this
period, characterised by the invention and intensiﬁcation of evermore tightly regulated borders marking the proper terrain of both
nation states and academic disciplines.
Like so many fathers, neither philosophy nor the academy has
ever had much time for children, and while celibacy is no longer a
requirement for entry it continues to be understood that we will
give our energy, time and bodies over to the production of books,
disciples, and Festschrifts. The higher our status, the less we have
to concern ourselves with the reproductive labour of preparing
other people’s children for adult life and the more with our own
legacy and the preservation of disciplinary propriety—we are to
be, Doktorväter rather than Doktormütter.
According to Lacan, the university discourse—that is, the social
formation of desire best exempliﬁed by the capitalist university—
is driven by the endless injunction to produce, a demand so
insistent and relentless that we are left unable to direct our
energies towards the question of how the social formation we
inhabit might be transformed. Our disciplinary labour is multiply
productive, functioning to generate proﬁt both for academic
publishers in particular (including, of course, the publisher of this
journal) and for capital more broadly;5 but also to effect the real
subsumption of our desire and energy—our souls—into the
neoliberal logics of endless (re-)production and ceaseless selfimprovement such that we are too busy, too tired, and too
anxious to stop, to think, to refuse.
A resident of Bormio, the Malleus Maleﬁcarum recounts, on
ﬁnding his child lost went in search of it and found 'a gathering of
women at night time', amongst whom 'the baby was being killed
and eaten while liquor was being consumed' (Kramer and
Sprenger, 2009, p. 212). Fortunately, Kramer and Sprenger
reassure us, the local authorities responded promptly and saw to
it that forty-one sorceresses were 'consigned to the ﬂames' while
others ﬂed the region. Contemporary academia is all too familiar
with the threat of women conspiring for the destruction of the
fragile disciplinary future, although a turn of the screw has us
worrying, in this age of #MeToo, less about witches than witch
hunts. As Edelman argues, the Child—the ﬁgure of the vulnerable
future for whose sake we must fall in line and commit to
reproducing the world as it is - signiﬁes not the youngest and
most vulnerable but the investment of the powerful in assuring
the continuation of their own power. To put this child to death, to
murder it in the womb or leave it on a hill to die is to refuse to
sacriﬁce our selves, our bodily autonomy, our own power for the
sake of our future careers, for the reputation of our heroes, for the
promise of prestige. But these acts of refusal and destruction are
dangerous when undertaken individually. 'More [women] were
executed for infanticide in 16th and 17th century Europe than for
any other crime, except for witchcraft' (Federici, 2004, p. 88–89);
and individual acts of refusal, from naming abusers, refusing to be
6

complicit in institutional cover-ups, or simply failing to be
sufﬁciently productive, bring forth more often the destruction of
the individuals concerned than any ﬁnal transformation of the
institutions, as Jason Reitman, Sara Ahmed, Jim Newell and
others could no doubt testify (Chu, 2018; Ahmed, 2016; Rigg,
2018). The great success of the late medieval witch hunts was not
merely in the prosecution of individuals, but the successful
expropriation knowledge and skills which had once been
collectively held. To begin to work towards the miscarriage or
abortion of our disciplinary futures must be, then, not simply to
enjoin individual acts of boldness but to forge new forms of
collective power and resistance in, around and despite the
structures of institutions which seek to divide us from one
another even as we are enjoined to sacriﬁce everything for a
collective future which will never be ours.
Devouring the child or offering the child to the devil. Sensitive
readers may ask how it is we can claim to be against the future,
even in the small sense of being against the reproduction of a
discipline. Given the state of the world we ﬁnd ourselves living in,
how could we possibly be against the future for which past
generations mortgaged their present? We are against the future as
the symbolic term that subverts and subjugates the now that we
live in. Our sympathy with witches extends beyond the humorous
(stealing penises so as to reveal the foolishness of men) or the
revolutionary (abortion as the reclamation of women’s bodily
autonomy against patriarchal servitude), to the ghoulish (offering
children to the devil) and the truly ghastly acts of witches. Witches are charged with the act of devouring children, of grinding
their sinewy ﬂesh and blood into a thick paste to be consumed.
We propose to take this particular aspect of the Malleus Maleﬁcarum as a model for our teaching and administrative practice.
It is not uncommon to ﬁnd that those who teach in philosophy
look to Socrates’s self-description as a midwife to model their
work in the classroom. There is a delicious connection here
between this idealised self-image of university teaching many of
us hold and the condemnation of witches in the Malleus
Maleﬁcarum. As Federici reminds us, Kramer and Sprenger
present midwives as “worse than any other woman” (Federici,
2004, p. 183). Why is the male midwife to be idealised, but the
female midwife demonised? The daimon that spoke to Socrates
provoked him to ask questions, to spur others to wisdom, and so
to birth a more stable and just polis. The demons that the witches
serve have a more nefarious goal and are unconcerned with
redeeming the city. We side, of course, with the demons here,
because we live in a world that ought not to exist. While
Socrates’s practice of philosophy asked deep questions about the
nature of things, ti esti, the witch is subject to a constructed world
of power that is presented as if it were just the nature of things.
Federici’s study of witch hunts and the ways of living those hunts
sought to destroy reveals that the control over biological
reproduction wielded by the heretical groups she surveys became
a way to experiment with radically different modes of being
together, to bring to birth radically different worlds. The
university is not such a world, even if it has interstitial spaces
where we might imagine such modes of life, or if at times it
provides the space and time to create analyses of this world that
ought not to exist.
It may be that Socrates was a more nefarious midwife than the
now exalted image of him suggests. But Kramer and Sprenger,
who appear suspicious of all midwives as potential witches, are
clear that midwives practice evil by killing babies after they
deliver them. One midwife, they report, confessed to killing more
than forty children by sticking pins into their heads and through
to their brains (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 368). They
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consider this to be a greater crime and to cause greater harm than
when witches cause impotence or miscarriages. Yet, we hazard
that this egregiousness is not because of the difference between
blocking procreation and the murder of a born human being; the
anxieties of the Malleus Maleﬁcarum are much less empirical.
Rather, Kramer and Sprenger are concerned with the appropriation of the Church’s proper authority, especially as that power is
inseparable from the power of the phallus.
Throughout Kramer and Sprenger’s discussions of witches
killing or offering babies to the devil there is a consistent focus on
the need to surveil women, to make sure that they are never not
under the watchful eye of authority. For example, one man
becomes suspicious of his wife and daughter when, after giving
birth, his wife permits no one but his daughter to come to her. He
then hides in order to observe his daughter’s actions and
discovers that she is, in the guise of carrying out her duties as a
midwife, performing witchcraft upon the baby. The father then
has both his wife and daughter convicted of sorcery and they are
burned together (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 369). The father
in this instance stands in for the power of the phallus, once again
raising the problem of the entanglement of the symbolic phallus
with gender. In the devouring of children or in offering them to
the devil, witches usurp the rule of the phallus and the power of
the proper authority. Kramer and Sprenger state this clearly
when, drawing upon Thomas Aquinas they say that, 'children are
a certain kind of property of the father in their body and slaves
and animals are the property of their owners' (Kramer and
Sprenger, 2009, p. 373). The concern for children is not a concern
for their person, but for the proper authority of the father over his
property.
We can see the anxiety over the maintenance of authority at
play too in the purposes that Kramer and Sprenger think demons
and witches pursue in devouring children and offering them to
the devil. For the demons, these acts serve three purposes: to
satisfy their arrogance, to make things look as much like holy rites
as possible, and to promote the further erosion of the faith by
preserving witches who have been dedicated to them from the
cradle (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 371). Authority is
threatened in the ﬁrst instance because the demons ﬂaunt their
arrogance before authority. In the second instance, authority is
eroded by performing in the material world practices and rites
that are similar to those offered by churches and clerics, but
which are not controlled by the proper authority. To battle
against this misuse of rites and sacraments, Kramer and Sprenger
advise not only that women should be surveilled when they meet
together, but also that special attention should be paid to how
women receive the host during communion (Kramer and
Sprenger, 2009, p. 320). Finally, the anxiety present in the last
instance returns us to the theme of reproduction, as the
inquisitors fear the growth of a population that is not a
reproduction of their own.
We must not infantilise our students; in addition to its regular
sense this also means that we must not treat students as if we are
reproducing ourselves in them. What is it that we would be
reproducing? The same structures that we decry at every turn. A
university we know to be structurally unequal, built on and for
violent and death-dealing distinctions of race, class and gender. A
discipline that we know to be too captured by its own concerns to
develop and grow in light of new questions that come from
outside of it, too concerned with its own self-propagation to
worry about the wives and daughters, the teachers and students
burned alive for the sake of the children. To teach critical
thinking must be to teach our students to think critically about
what they are being taught and why, about the inescapable
antagonism between the desire to be transformed by learning and
the need to meet certain criteria in order to get a degree.6 While
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we cannot and should not refuse the task of passing on to our
students the skills that they need to survive in this world, to offer
them to devil or even to devour them would mean teaching in
such a way that allows them to think beyond the demand to
reproduce that world; to teach them what they need to know, but
not to believe in it too much.
The current climate is not one in which the reproduction of the
university seems guaranteed. The rise of precarity and everintensifying competition in every area of academic life, burgeoning debt crises, and threats to our funding have made many of us
fear for the future; for our future and for the future of institutions
and positions which, however exploitative, have nonetheless been
for many of us a refuge. It is tempting to look longingly back at
our ancestral past, to seek to cling to what wealth we have
inherited. But we too must resist the temptation to believe too
much in the university, which has always been built on and
sustained by violence. We cannot offer our children to the devil
until we, too, have switched our allegiance.
Exit through the Bestiary
The anxieties about reproduction we have sketched in this essay
spill over into other anxieties, in keeping with the diffuse nature
of anxiety. The anxiety about reproduction spills over into anxiety
about the maintenance of boundaries, of identities and their
attendant purities. In taking a position against the reproduction
of Continental philosophy of religion we are taking a position for
the impurity of a practice whose name may be continental philosophy of religion. What is called for is the miscegenation of
continental philosophy of religion rather than the attempt to
secure its purity, a purity that is as illusory as all pure identities
are. For Kramer and Sprenger, although it may appear that
humans can be turned “into the shape of beasts through the art of
conjuring”, a man is never truly transmogriﬁed into something
other than himself (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 171). The
authors go to great lengths to argue that whatever bodily change
appears to have taken place, it is always a matter of demons and
witches working to deceive the senses. By way of concluding let us
set aside this defensive posture of Kramer and Sprenger, let us
reject their claim of the hallucinatory nature of witchcraft and
instead think from within those hallucinations as if they were
reality. There is good reason to do so, for the world generated by
the logic of policing present in the Malleus Maleﬁcarum produces
the most dangerous hallucination: of a world that is not experienced as a hallucination. They produce, then, a psychosis, a
complete break from reality precisely in their attempt to control
that reality. Let us conclude by thinking the miscegenation of
thought, the blurring of things into one another.
Within the Malleus Maleﬁcarum there are a number of points
where the concern for the purity of identity is displayed, most
clearly in the fear of transmogriﬁcation from which we have
borrowed our overarching model of engaging with the Malleus
Maleﬁcarum. That one could be transformed from a man into an
animal or that the barrier between life and death could be blurred
through 'nigromancy'. This translation choice of Christopher S.
Mackay is made to conserve the false etymology of the medieval
form of necromancy, which literally means 'corpse divination'.
Mackay explains that the medieval form arises from a confusion
between the words for blackness and corpse, 'Once knowledge of
Greek was lost in Western Europe in the early medieval period,
this element was confused with the Latin niger (black)' (Kramer
and Sprenger, 2009, p. 56). We remain unconvinced by his claim
that this malaprop emerges from an association of the colour of
nighttime with evil; Geraldine Heng, amongst many others today
working on the question of race in medieval Europe, has shown
that the association of blackness with evil extended far beyond the
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nighttime and was explicitly concerned with the racialisation of
blackness at least as far back as 1260 (Heng, 2011, p. 259).
Kramer and Sprenger, always taking care to undercut the
power of witchcraft as much as they can, claim that nigromancy is
not, as is commonly feared, the power to bring the dead back to
life but, instead, the conjuring of demons. It is these demons who
fool people into thinking they have raised the dead. They do so by
taking on the appearance of the deceased person they are trying
to summon (Kramer and Sprenger, 2009, p. 243). The last bit of
authority is wrested from a man here, for no man can control his
identity or defend himself in death. That a demon would take on
this appearance creates even more anxiety. The connection here
with the way that settler-colonial descendants of white Europeans
interpret the blackness of a person is not lost on us here. One
need only remember the words of the murderer of the black
teenager Michael Brown, 'The only way I can describe it [sic], it
[sic] looks like a demon' (State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson,
2014, p. 225).
When considering the construction of the colonial world by
European Christians and its extension by European secularists
one is struck by the way that creation proceeds through separation or division. In the same way that creation comes to be
through the separation of waters from the land, from night and
day, so too does the colonial world come to be through the
separation of the colonial zone from the native zone (see Fanon,
2004, pp. 1–62), through the separation of the city and the natural
world, the domesticated and the wild, the human and the slave
(see Wilderson, 2010). Such divisions are constructed but come to
be naturalised through being folded into a metaphysical vision of
the world and the attendant changes to the social brought about
by that vision. Thus, in the white European imaginary, blackness
comes to be associated with death and then comes to be associated with act of disrespecting the boundary between life and
death, creating a kind of existence as a zombie or living-death.
This imaginary, however, becomes a reality for those who come to
be enslaved. In order to protect themselves from the evil of
blackness, to postpone such a closeness with death, the white
European subjects black-skinned Africans to social death, transmogrifying these Africans of various tribes and nations into
“black bodies” that exist in a liminal state between life and death.
The illusory violence feared in the loss of authority and the
sovereignty of the church is visited upon those people who are
denied their humanity through the social death of slavery, deﬁned
by Orlando Patterson as 'the permanent, violent domination of
natally alienated and generally dishonoured persons' (Patterson,
1982, p. 13).
To refuse the reproduction of continental philosophy of religion is to begin to refuse the reproduction of such a world. It
would be impossible to simply live as if these boundaries no
longer existed. To do so would be to ignore the demands for
survival in a world that forces complicity; but it would also be to
live as if in an innocence that is illusory. Yet, as philosophers of
religion, one can call up the dead and make them give account.
These dead may in fact be the demons that are hallucinated by
whiteness, but they are demons who in taking on the appearance
of the dead make them speak a truth covered over and hidden in
the philosophical and theological texts of the dead. We may begin
to think of this understanding of the demonic as a way to engage
with Black Studies and other radical intellectual practices that call
the European tradition of philosophy and the humanities generally to account. To think about the white tradition under the
conditions of those scholars and their work in order to make the
dead speak anew and to honour those other dead whose lives
were made death in their living.
Slaves are placed alongside women, children, and animals, who
all exist as the property of men in the Malleus Maleﬁcarum. The
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division between human and animal begins with ownership, such
that those who are owned are not fully human beings, placed
instead in the Malleus Maleﬁcarum’s bestiary. While many different animals play a role within the Malleus Maleﬁcarum’s taxonomy of magic, two beasts take special prominence: the cow and
the wolf. This is a clear division of the non-human animal world
into the domesticated and the wild. In each instance, whether
focusing on the cow or the wolf, the authors consider these
animals only in relation to the survival of men and their
dependents. The wolf threatens to overpower and kill the man
under the power of witches (though sometimes the wolf will kill
simply according to its nature—because it is a wolf, rather than
because of any magical interference) and the cow threatens to
stop giving milk under the direct intervention of witches (Kramer
and Sprenger, 2009, p. 315).
Along with the nigromancer, let us take our model for thinking
from this closeness to death found also in the couple of the cow
and the wolf. The Cathars—a community positioned as heretical
by dominant Christian society, and subject to intense persecution
and eventually to mass murder—might align with the cow
through their refusal to produce. Federici writes of the Cathars
that their anti-natalism is part and parcel of their vegetarianism
or resistance to participation in the economy of death. 'The
Cathars', she writes 'also rejected marriage and procreation and
were strict vegetarians, both because they refused to kill animals
and because they wished to avoid any food, like eggs and meats,
resulting from sexual generation' (Federici, 2004, p. 35). This
refusal of sexual generation enthralled to the logic of production
does not ﬁnd its roots in puritanical ethics, but rather stems from
'a refusal of life “degraded to mere survival” ' (Federici, 2004, p.
35). So much of intellectual and academic life today is domesticated and subject to the everyday violence of mere survival. The
cow, like the Cathar, is well-placed to see the truth of the system,
its reliance on death, precisely because the cow only exists in the
system to die. To refuse mere survival requires that we be honest
and clearsighted about the prospects of freedom and liberation.
The cow is domesticated, but refuses to produce.
The wolf is a fearsome animal in the bestiary of the Malleus
Maleﬁcarum because the wolf is wild. The wolf threatens the
borders of the village and threatens to overpower the strength of
the human. The Europe of the Malleus Maleﬁcarum understands
itself as threatened from the outside by Islam. In contemplating
friendship with the wolf, continental philosophy of religion must
embrace the witches’ friendship with those who stand as 'wild', as
outside the direct control of the Christian-secular world. For
Kramer and Sprenger it is in the wolf’s nature to eat people; and
yet sometimes they do so because of demons (Kramer and
Sprenger, 2009, pp. 209–210). Continental philosophy of religion
has been largely a Christian-secular enterprise with very little
engagement outside of that tradition aside from engagements
with European Judaism. This engagement has often been
undertaken in a supplementary way, sometimes repeating certain
supercessionist tropes from the Christian legacy and a certain
domestication of Jewish faith and practice common in the secular
division between “good religious” and “bad religious.” While the
real living tradition of Islam contains its own processes of
reproduction, the ﬁgure of the Muslim and his or her categorisation in the Christian-secular world delineate him or her as a
sinthomosexual.
Lee Edelman has remarked that 'homosexuality, in certain
Western democracies, may be shedding (in part) its connection to
queerness, continuing the process of normalisation by which it
mirrors and so reinforces dominant ideologies of social relation'
(Edelman, 2017, p. 125). The queerness that threatens social order
is never a given, it never arises from a single act or as a positive
identity. Such is the lesson that Leo Bersani takes from Foucault’s
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remarks that 'What makes homosexuality “disturbing” is the
homosexual mode of life, much more than the sexual act itself'
(Foucault, 1997, pp. 136–137); this leads him to critique the easy
identiﬁcation of gay practices with radical politics (see Bersani,
2010, p. 12). It is in this way that a non-reproductive continental
philosophy of religion can and should engage with a tradition like
Islam, a tradition like queer theory, and with those who work
between and across such traditions. Continental philosophy of
religion should engage with them especially in the violent form
hallucinated by the West and in the violence that queer Muslims
bring to the very unitary vision of Islam and the unitary vision of
the LGBTQ community (see El-Tayeb, 2012). There is something
to the shared casting of the wolf, the Muslim, and the queer as
sinthomosexual which calls for a non-reproductive engagement.
For they are all cast as violent 'by nature' in the imaginary of the
Christian-secular world. In joining, as witches do, with the violence of the wolf we may begin to think through the decision
made in our tradition to see violence when it is directed against
the social order of reproduction, and not see the violence that is
undertaken to secure and protect the social order of reproduction.
The future is likely to be as violent as the present. The anxiety
to protect the reproduction of continental philosophy of religion
will not save our colleagues or students from that violence and is
in fact generated by violent structures. To give up on our anxiety
is to embrace the joy of staying in bed, to stay in the arms of your
lover or lovers. Yet we cannot retreat to the privatised and
domesticated pleasures of the bourgeois family home. The image
of the Witches’ Sabbath suggests another way of coming together,
of joining with others who similarly cannot afford the future, of
shedding one’s private identity within a dance, a feast, a frenzy in
which the ﬂesh of one is confused for that of another, and where
it really does not matter—omnia sunt communia, after all. Let the
future come or not; now is the time of pleasure, of getting what
we want for nothing.
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Notes
1 This is a philosophical adaptation of the common charge against witches, that they
used their magic for that most unforgivable of all sins: to obtain what they wanted
'without work' (Federici, 2004, p. 142).
2 Laruelle’s notion of 'philo-ﬁction' is developed at length in English in Laruelle (2013,
pp. 197–233). Philo-ﬁction can be understood as the result of the method of nonphilosophy. Non-philosophy aims to disempower what Laruelle sees as philosophy’s
self-sufﬁciency or 'arrogance'—its claim to produce truths regarding the Real or the
Real’s manifestations as phenomena. For Laruelle, philosophy becomes a practice that
produces thinking about itself and in so doing confuses itself for the object it aims to
know. Philo-ﬁction becomes a way of conceiving of philosophy undertaken alongside
other forms of thought. In this practice we are able to engage with other modes of
thought, other forms of knowledge, as if they are already doing philosophy and we can
fabulate those thoughts as philosophy. For other examples of this method in practice
(see Smith, 2013).
3 See, e.g., Mill (1869), 'Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by
others must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury'.
4 Examples abound; see, e.g., Crockett et al. (2014); Joy (2011); Baker and Maxwell
(2003); Smith and Whistler (2010); Smith (2009) and the 2017 American Academy of
Religion panel on 'Reframing the Continental Philosophy of Religion' out of which this
paper emerged.
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5 As a recent email from one of the author’s institutions pointed out, for example, the
funding body Research England ' “has identiﬁed new priorities towards which our
spending must be directed”, including, “addressing the needs of local innovative
business”, and “spin outs and start ups” '.
6 For example, one of the authors opens her ﬁrst year introductory module by asking
students to think about the different people and institutions who have a stake in their
education and where there are conﬂicts between, for example, what the government,
their families, their lecturers and they themselves want them to get out of their degree.
On the administrative side of things, the other author has been part of a redesign of
mandatory assessment within his department so as to create opportunities for adjunct
faculty to use the assessment process to ask for resources which would improve their
working conditions.
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